Patent Drafting Analysis of K2 Network Labs’s Privacy-Preserving Transformer Model with Encrypted Dimensionality Reduction | US 12,335,379 B1
Patent Drafting Analysis of K2 Network Labs's Privacy-Preserving Transformer Model with Encrypted Dimensionality Reduction | US 12,335,379 B1
A structural and strategic analysis of US 12,335,379 B1 covering claim architecture, drafting quality, §101 eligibility positioning, critical gaps, and prosecution defensibility across method, system, and CRM claim types.
Spec Words
9,800
Across 6 sections
Draft now ↗
Total Claims
30
3 independent · 27 dependent
Draft now ↗
Figure Sheets
8
Flow diagrams, system architecture, inference environments
Draft now ↗
Published by PatSnap Insights Team · · 13 min read Verified by PatSnap Eureka Data
Overview
Structural Overview
The detailed description dominates at approximately 44% of total words (~5,200 words), with a substantial background section (~2,080 words) and a claims section (~2,600 words) reflecting a complex multi-claim structure. The patent presents 30 total claims across 3 independent claims (method, system, CRM), with a 9:1 dependent-to-independent ratio well above typical software/AI norms, providing layered fallback positions. Figure coverage spans 8 sheets covering method flowcharts, system block diagrams, sequence diagrams, data pipeline architectures, private inference environments, secure compute layers, and computing hardware platforms.
Section Word Distribution
↗ Click bars to exploreFigure Inventory — 8 Sheets
| Figure | Description | Role |
|---|---|---|
| FIG. 1 | Flowchart of the complete method 100 for processing data using a transformer model with privacy preservation, showing steps 102–124 from input reception through signature verification, weight decryption, and model update.Search in Eureka ↗ | Flow diagram |
| FIG. 2 | Block diagram of the privacy-preserving transformer model system 100 showing hierarchical components: Input Layer 110, Input Privacy Layer 120 (with down projection 121, transformation 122, noise addition 123, up projection 124), Execution Layer 130, Encryption System 140, Decryption System 150, Model Update System 160, Privacy Monitoring System 170, and Key Management System 180.Search in Eureka ↗ | System architecture |
| FIG. 3 | Detailed sequence diagram illustrating interactions between Input Layer, Input Privacy Layer, Execution Layer, Encryption System, Blockchain Addresses, Decryption System, and Model Update System across steps S1–S15.Search in Eureka ↗ | Flow diagram |
| FIG. 4 | System diagram of a comprehensive data processing and analysis architecture showing raw data ingestion, event streams, embeddings pipeline, Model Sandbox with LLM and Classic Models, Privacy Preservation module (Differential Privacy, FL, FHE), Aggregation, and Rapid Data Analysis stages.Search in Eureka ↗ | System architecture |
| FIG. 5 | Block diagram of a private inference system showing three operational environments — On Prem (clear data), In Region (neural network with encrypted privacy layer matrix values), and Cloud (embeddings-based inference) — with data flow between environments.Search in Eureka ↗ | Key embodiment |
| FIG. 6 | System architecture diagram of a data processing system divided into On Prem/In Region section and Secure Compute & Data Transformation Layer, showing privileged data paths, differential privacy, embeddings, compute nodes, Silver/Gold processing stages, and Insights as a Service output.Search in Eureka ↗ | System architecture |
| FIG. 7 | Block diagram of computing system 900 showing processor 902, main memory 904, static memory 906, GPU 922, network interface 908, data storage 918 with machine-readable medium 924, and peripheral devices all interconnected via bus 930.Search in Eureka ↗ | Claim support |
| FIG. 8 | Block diagram of computer system 1000 showing communication infrastructure 1006, processor 1004, main memory 1008, secondary memory 1010 (including hard disk 1012, removable storage drive 1014), user I/O interface 1002, and communications interface 1024 with communications path 1026.Search in Eureka ↗ | Claim support |
Analysis powered by PatSnap Eureka. Patent text and figures publicly available from USPTO. Draft a Similar Patent
Claims
Claim Architecture Analysis
The patent presents 3 independent claims — Claim 1 (computerized method), Claim 14 (system), and Claim 28 (non-transitory computer-readable medium) — providing tripartite enforcement coverage across method, apparatus, and CRM formats. With 27 dependent claims across 3 independent claims, the 9:1 dependent-to-independent ratio significantly exceeds the software/AI industry norm of approximately 4–8:1, suggesting aggressive layered protection for downstream fallback positions. The claim strategy integrates two distinct inventive pillars — dimensionality-reduction-based input privacy and blockchain-distributed secret sharing for weight encryption — into every independent claim, creating a conjunctive claim structure that may prove narrower than the actual inventive contribution.
Core inventive concept: The claims address the problem of protecting transformer model weights and input data privacy during distributed AI inference by combining an input privacy layer (comprising down projection, transformation, and up projection operations positioned horizontally between the input and execution layers) with a blockchain-based threshold signature scheme — specifically, splitting an encryption key into K shares distributed across K distinct blockchain addresses, requiring T-of-K signatures for reconstruction, and decrypting weights only if all T signatures are verified.
Independent Claim Dissection
| Claim | Preamble | Transition | Key Body Elements |
|---|---|---|---|
| Claim 1 | A computerized method for implementing a privacy-preserving transformer model with secure key management | comprising | receiving input data from computerized storage; applying dimensionality reduction via input privacy layer (down projection N→M, transformation, up projection M→N) positioned horizontally between input and execution layers; generating encryption key via CSPRNG; splitting into K shares via secret sharing scheme; distributing K shares among K blockchain addresses; encrypting individual key shares with blockchain public keys; encrypting input privacy layer weights; receiving T signatures from T distinct blockchain addresses; reconstructing key via polynomial interpolation; verifying all T signatures; decrypting weights only if all T verified; updating transformer model with decrypted weights; protecting against tampering via secret sharing and blockchain addressesSearch prior art ↗ |
| Claim 14 | A system | comprising | a processor; a memory storing instructions that, when executed, cause the system to perform all operations of Claim 1's method including input privacy layer operations, encryption key generation, secret sharing, blockchain distribution, T-of-K signature collection and verification, weight decryption, and tamper protectionSearch prior art ↗ |
| Claim 28 | A non-transitory computer-readable medium storing instructions that, when executed by a processor, cause the processor to perform operations | comprising | identical operational scope to Claims 1 and 14: dimensionality reduction via input privacy layer, CSPRNG key generation, K-share secret sharing, blockchain distribution, individual share encryption, weight encryption, T-of-K signature collection and verification, weight decryption conditioned on all T signatures, model update, and tamper protectionSearch prior art ↗ |
Claim Dependency Tree
1 Computerized method — input privacy layer with down/up projection + blockchain T-of-K secret sharing for weight encryption and decryptionSearch Claim 1 prior art ↗
2 Adds: processing all input data through input privacy layer before passing to any subsequent transformer layersSearch in Eureka ↗
3 Adds: input privacy layer maintains same input and output dimensionality as the input layerSearch in Eureka ↗
4 Adds: input privacy layer applies privacy-preserving transformations uniformly across all input featuresSearch in Eureka ↗
5 Adds: noise addition operation on compressed data — Gaussian noise scaled to privacy budget, dynamic adjustment during training/inferenceSearch in Eureka ↗
6 Adds: adaptive adjustment of lower dimension M based on privacy budget, target accuracy threshold, and computational resource constraintSearch in Eureka ↗
7 Adds: monitoring privacy metrics (compression ratio, reconstruction error, privacy budget consumption rate, noise magnitude) and adjusting hyperparametersSearch in Eureka ↗
8 Adds: encryption key generation details — deriving from random seed using key derivation function, storing metadata in secure enclaveSearch in Eureka ↗
9 Adds: Shamir's Secret Sharing scheme — polynomial of degree T−1, constant term = encryption key, K points generate K shares with unique identifiersSearch in Eureka ↗
10 Adds: distributing K shares via secure communication channel, mapping in distributed ledger, time-lock mechanism preventing share retrieval before specified timeSearch in Eureka ↗
11 Adds: reconstructing encryption key — verifying signature count ≥ T, validating each signature, retrieving encrypted shares, decrypting with private keys, applying Lagrange interpolationSearch in Eureka ↗
12 Adds: key rotation protocol — new key generated and split at predefined intervals, transition period with both keys valid, re-encryption of weights, secure destruction of old keySearch in Eureka ↗
13 Adds: three-region sovereign data distribution — on-premises (raw data, initial embeddings), sovereign-compliant regional (dimensionality reduction, partial execution, encryption), separate cloud (remaining execution, blockchain distribution, signature collection, model update)Search in Eureka ↗
14 System — processor + memory storing instructions performing all operations of Claim 1's method with input privacy layer, blockchain secret sharing, and tamper protectionSearch Claim 14 prior art ↗
15 Adds: processing all input data through input privacy layer before subsequent layersSearch in Eureka ↗
16 Adds: input privacy layer maintains same input/output dimensionality as input layerSearch in Eureka ↗
17 Adds: uniform privacy-preserving transformations across all input featuresSearch in Eureka ↗
18 Adds: noise addition operation — Gaussian noise scaled to privacy budget, dynamic adjustmentSearch in Eureka ↗
19 Adds: adaptive M adjustment based on privacy budget, target accuracy, and computational resource constraintSearch in Eureka ↗
20 Adds: monitoring privacy metrics and adjusting hyperparameters to maintain privacy-utility trade-offSearch in Eureka ↗
21 Adds: key generation — CSPRNG random seed, key derivation function, metadata stored in secure enclaveSearch in Eureka ↗
22 Adds: three-region sovereign distribution (on-premises, sovereign-compliant regional, separate cloud) with same structure as Claim 13Search in Eureka ↗
23 Adds: Shamir's Secret Sharing — polynomial of degree T−1, constant term = encryption key, K points, unique identifiersSearch in Eureka ↗
24 Adds: distributing shares via secure channel, mapping in distributed ledger, time-lock mechanismSearch in Eureka ↗
25 Adds: key reconstruction — verifying signature count ≥ T, validating signatures, retrieving encrypted shares, Lagrange interpolationSearch in Eureka ↗
26 Adds: key rotation protocol with transition period, re-encryption, secure destruction of old keySearch in Eureka ↗
27 Adds: network interface for blockchain communication and secure hardware element for cryptographic key storage and operationsSearch in Eureka ↗
28 Non-transitory CRM — processor-executable operations performing all method steps of Claims 1/14 with input privacy layer, blockchain secret sharing, tamper protectionSearch Claim 28 prior art ↗
29 Adds: monitoring privacy metrics and adjusting hyperparameters — same structure as Claims 7 and 20Search in Eureka ↗
30 Adds: adaptive size M adjustment based on privacy budget, target accuracy, and computational resource constraint — same structure as Claims 6 and 19Search in Eureka ↗
| Metric | This Application | Software / Cloud Norm |
|---|---|---|
| Total claims | 30 | 15 – 25 |
| Independent claim count | 3 | 1 – 3 |
| Dependent : Independent ratio | 9.00 : 1 | 4 – 8 : 1 |
| Method claims present? | Yes — Claim 1 | Common |
| System / apparatus claims? | Yes — Claim 14 | Common |
Analysis powered by PatSnap Eureka. Patent text and figures publicly available from USPTO. Draft a Similar Patent
Drafting Quality
Drafting Quality Signals
The claim set demonstrates strong structural layering through its 9:1 dependent-to-independent ratio, with Claims 9/23 explicitly naming Shamir's Secret Sharing and Claims 12/26 adding key rotation protocols as meaningful fallback positions. However, the conjunctive requirement in every independent claim that both the input privacy layer architecture AND the blockchain T-of-K scheme must be present creates a significant breadth risk, as a competitor implementing only one pillar would not infringe.
✅
Antecedent Basis
The claim set maintains generally clean antecedent basis throughout. The key variables K, T, M, and N are each introduced with explicit definitional language in Claim 1 (e.g., "K is an integer greater than 1," "T is an integer less than or equal to K and greater than or equal to a predefined threshold," "M<N"), enabling their unambiguous reuse in dependent claims. Claims 9, 10, 11, and 12 each properly reference "the encryption key," "the K shares," and "the T signatures" introduced in Claim 1, with no identified dangling antecedent basis issues across the 30-claim set.
✅
Spec–Claim Consistency
All major independent claim limitations map to specific figures and paragraphs. The down projection (step S3 in FIG. 3, module 121 in FIG. 2) and up projection (step S5, module 124) map to Claim 1's input privacy layer definition. The key splitting (steps S7–S8 in FIG. 3, module 142 in FIG. 2) and blockchain distribution (step S9, FIG. 3) map directly to the secret sharing limitations. The T-signature collection (step S11, FIG. 3) and decryption conditioned on signature verification (steps S13–S14, FIG. 3) are consistently supported across the specification's detailed description sections at pages 11–14.
✅
Transition Word Usage
All three independent claims (1, 14, 28) correctly use "comprising" as the transition word, preserving open-ended claim scope and preventing easy design-around by adding unclaimed elements. The method claim preamble "for implementing a privacy-preserving transformer model with secure key management" is appropriately functional without reciting unnecessary structural limitations. No "consisting of" or "consisting essentially of" language appears anywhere in the claim set, which is the strategically correct choice for this technology domain where the claim elements represent a minimum viable combination rather than an exhaustive enumeration.
✅
§112(f) Means-Plus-Function Risk
No "means for" or "step for" language appears in any of the 30 claims, eliminating direct §112(f) invocation risk. The system claim (Claim 14) uses a "memory storing instructions that, when executed by the processor, cause the system to" formulation rather than functional claim elements, which courts have generally treated as structural rather than §112(f) language. The specification's detailed description provides sufficient structural disclosure for modules 121, 122, 123, 124, 141, 142, 144, 151, 153, and 154 (FIG. 2) to support the functional claim language without §112(f) consequences.
⚠️
§101 Eligibility Risk
Despite the granted status, the independent claims face non-trivial Alice step-two risk because the core operations — applying dimensionality reduction, generating encryption keys, splitting keys, and distributing shares — could be characterized as abstract mathematical processes performed on a general-purpose processor. The hardware tie-in in Claim 1 relies primarily on "a computerized processor" and "a computerized storage device," which post-Alice jurisprudence has not consistently treated as sufficient to confer eligibility. Claim 14's processor-plus-memory structure provides a stronger §101 defense through its ordered combination with the blockchain address distribution limitation, which represents an unconventional technical arrangement; however, this defense would be stronger if the claims explicitly recited the secure hardware element (mentioned in Claim 27 only as a dependent limitation).
⚠️
Dependent Claim Fallback Quality
The dependent claims are structurally sound but suffer from substantial mirroring across all three independent claims: Claims 2–13 (depending from Claim 1), Claims 15–27 (depending from Claim 14), and Claims 29–30 (depending from Claim 28) largely replicate the same subject matter, with the CRM claim receiving only 2 dependents compared to 13 for the method. Claims 9/23 (Shamir's Secret Sharing), 12/26 (key rotation), and 13/22 (three-region sovereign deployment) add genuinely distinct fallback positions with significant commercial value; however, Claims 3/16 (same dimensionality) and 4/17 (uniform feature application) add only minor restrictions that would not represent meaningful prosecution fallback positions against a prior art rejection targeting the core combination.
⚠️
Abstract Quality
The abstract accurately describes the method at a high level and does mention the key inventive mechanism — "splitting the encryption key into shares, distributing the shares among blockchain addresses" — but its opening framing as "a method for processing data using a transformer model with privacy preservation" is generic enough that an examiner scanning the abstract would not immediately identify the T-of-K blockchain threshold signature scheme as the distinguishing technical contribution. The abstract correctly identifies the input privacy layer's down projection, transformation, and up projection operations and the full decryption workflow, making it technically accurate; however, the absence of any reference to Shamir's Secret Sharing or threshold signatures in the abstract means the novel cryptographic mechanism is underdescribed at the entry point.
✅
Figure Support Quality
Figure coverage is comprehensive for all major structural claim limitations. FIG. 2 directly maps to Claim 1's input privacy layer components (modules 121, 122, 123, 124) and the encryption system components (141, 142, 144). FIG. 3 provides sequential step-by-step support for the full workflow in Claims 1, 14, and 28, including steps S7 (key generation), S8 (key splitting), S9 (share distribution), S10 (weight encryption), S11 (signature collection), S12 (key reconstruction), S13 (signature verification), S14 (weight decryption), and S15 (model update). FIG. 5 and FIG. 6 provide embodiment support for Claim 13/22's three-region sovereign distribution limitation. The only limitation lacking dedicated figure support is the secure hardware element recited in Claim 27, which appears only in text at pages 8 and 30.
Analysis powered by PatSnap Eureka. Patent text and figures publicly available from USPTO. Draft a Similar Patent
Scorecard
Strategic Intent Scorecard
Multi-dimensional assessment of this application's patent strategy quality, based on claim structure, specification depth, and prosecution positioning.
Claim Breadth
3
Prosecution Defensibility
3.5
Spec–Claim Consistency
4.5
Dependent Claim Coverage
3.5
Claim Type Diversity
4
Figure Support Quality
4.5
Key observation: Spec–Claim Consistency and Figure Support Quality both score highest (4.5/5.0) because every structural claim limitation in Claims 1, 14, and 28 maps directly to a named module in FIG. 2, a sequenced step in FIG. 3, and a specific paragraph in the detailed description — a level of cross-referencing that substantially reduces §112(a) written description risk. Claim Breadth scores lowest (3.0/5.0) because the independent claims conjunctively require both the input privacy layer architecture (down projection, transformation, up projection) and the full blockchain T-of-K threshold signature scheme, meaning a competitor who implements the dimensionality-reduction privacy layer with a different key management approach, or vice versa, would not infringe — a design-around path that a stronger filing would have foreclosed by prosecuting separate independent claims on each inventive pillar. Practitioners should note that continuation filings covering the dimensionality reduction layer alone, and the blockchain secret sharing mechanism applied to any neural network weights (not just the input privacy layer), represent high-value prosecution opportunities.
See how your own draft compares — Open Eureka IP Drafting →
Critical Gaps
3 Critical Gaps in This Claim Set
A senior-attorney lens on the three highest-priority structural weaknesses — what each exposes in prosecution and litigation, and what a stronger filing would have done differently.
🔒
3 Critical Gaps in This Claim Set
See the full attorney-level analysis of what this application leaves unprotected — and how to draft it more defensively for your own filings.
Conjunctive claim limits single-pillar infringement No standalone subsystem apparatus claims CRM claims underdeveloped — only 2 of 13 dependents
Unlock Full Analysis — Free Frequently asked questions
US 12,335,379 B1 — key questions answered
Still have questions? PatSnap Eureka can answer them from patent data instantly. Search in Eureka
Disclaimer: This analysis is generated by PatSnap Eureka AI based on publicly available patent data from the USPTO. It does not constitute legal advice and should not be relied upon as such. Patent data may be subject to change as prosecution progresses. Scores and assessments reflect automated analysis and may not capture all relevant legal or technical nuances. Always consult a qualified patent attorney for formal legal opinions on patentability, freedom to operate, or infringement.
Ask anything about this patent.
PatSnap Eureka searches patents and data to answer instantly.
PatSnap Eureka searches patents and data to answer instantly.
Powered by PatSnap Eureka
Link copied to clipboard